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Abstract: We develop a model for practical, entanglement-based long-
distance quantum key distribution employing entanglement swapping as a
key building block. Relying only on existing off-the-shelf technology, we
show how to optimize resources so as to maximize secret key distribution
rates. The tools comprise lossy transmission links, such as telecom optical
fibers or free space, parametric down-conversion sources of entangled pho-
ton pairs, and threshold detectors that are inefficient and have dark counts.
Our analysis provides the optimal trade-off between detector efficiency and
dark counts, which are usually competing, as well as the optimal source
brightness that maximizes the secret key rate for specified distances (i.e.
loss) between sender and receiver.
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OCIS codes: (270.5565) Quantum communications; (270.5568) Quantum cryptography.
References and links
1. http://www.idquantique.com
http://www.magiqtech.com
2. N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel, and H. Zbinden, “Quantum cryptography,” Rev. Mod. Phys. 74, 145–195 (2002).
3. E. Waks, A. Zeevi, and Y. Yamamoto, “Security of quantum key distribution with entangled photons against
individual attacks,” Phys. Rev. A 65, 052310 (2002).
4. B. C. Jacobs, T. B. Pittman, and D. Franson, “Quantum relays and noise suppression using linear optics,” Phys.
Rev. A 66, 052307 (2002).
5. H. de Riedmatten, I. Marcikic, W. Tittel, H. Zbinden, D. Collins, and N. Gisin, “Long Distance Quantum Tele-
portation in a Quantum Relay Configuration,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 92, 047904 (2004).
6. D. Collins, N. Gisin, and H. de Riedmatten, “Quantum relays for long distance quantum cryptography,”
J. Mod. Opt. 52, 735–753 (2005).
7. H. J. Briegel, W. Du¨r, J. I. Cirac, and P. Zoller, “Quantum Repeaters: The Role of Imperfect Local Operations in
Quantum Communication,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 81, 5932–5935 (1998).
8. M. ˙Zukowski, A. Zeilinger, M. A. Horne, and A. K. Ekert, “‘Event-ready-detectors’ Bell experiment via entan-
glement swapping,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 71, 4287–4290 (1993).
9. A. Scherer, G. Howard, B. C. Sanders, and W. Tittel, “Quantum states prepared by realistic entanglement swap-
ping,” Phys. Rev. A 80, 062310 (2009).
10. V. Scarani, H. Bechmann-Pasquinucci, N. J. Cerf, M. Dusˇek, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, and M. Peev, “The security of
practical quantum key distribution,” Rev. Mod. Phys. 81, 1301–1350 (2009).
11. G. Brassard, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, T. Mor, and B. C. Sanders, “Limitations on Practical Quantum Cryptography,”
Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 1330–1333 (2000).
12. C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, “Quantum cryptography: public key distribution and coin tossing,” in Proceedings
of IEEE International Conference on Computers, Systems and Signal Processing (Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers, Bangalore, India, 1984), pp. 175–179.
13. X. Ma, C.-H. F. Fung, and H.-K. Lo, “Quantum key distribution with entangled photon sources,” Phys. Rev. A
76, 012307 (2007).
14. I. Marcikic, H. de Riedmatten, W. Tittel, V. Scarani, H. Zbinden, and N. Gisin, “Time-bin entangled qubits for
quantum communication created by femtosecond pulses,” Phys. Rev. A 66, 062308 (2002).
15. H. de Riedmatten, V. Scarani, I. Marcikic, A. Acı´n, W. Tittel, H. Zbinden, and N. Gisin, “Two independent photon
pairs versus four-photon entangled states in parametric down conversion,” J. Mod. Opt. 51, 1637–1649 (2004).
16. C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, and N. D. Mermin, “Quantum cryptography without Bell’s theorem,” Phys. Rev. Lett.
68, 557–559 (1992).
17. W.-Y. Hwang, “Quantum Key Distribution with High Loss: Toward Global Secure Communication,”
Phys. Rev. Lett. 91, 057901 (2003).
18. X.-B. Wang, “Beating the Photon-Number-Splitting Attack in Practical Quantum Cryptography,” Phys. Rev.
Lett. 94, 230503 (2005).
19. H.-K. Lo, X. Ma, and K. Chen, “Decoy State Quantum Key Distribution,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, 230504 (2005).
20. X. Ma, B. Qi, Y. Zhao, and H.-K. Lo, “Practical decoy state for quantum key distribution,” Phys. Rev. A 72,
012326 (2005).
21. X.-B. Wang, “Decoy-state protocol for quantum cryptography with four different intensities of coherent light,”
Phys. Rev. A 72, 012322 (2005).
22. Y. Zhao, B. Qi, X. Ma, H.-K. Lo, and L. Qian, “Experimental Quantum Key Distribution with Decoy States,”
Phys. Rev. Lett. 96, 070502 (2006).
23. N. Lu¨tkenhaus, “Security against individual attacks for realistic quantum key distribution,” Phys. Rev. A 61,
052304 (2000).
24. l.-M. Duan, M. D. Lukin, J. I. Cirac, and P. Zoller, “Long-distance quantum communication with atomic ensem-
bles and linear optics,” Nature 414, 413–418, 2001.
25. J. B. Brask and A. S. Sørensen, “Memory imperfections in atomic-ensemble-based quantum repeaters,” Phys.
Rev. A 78, 012350 (2008).
26. L. Jiang, J. M. Taylor, and M. D. Lukin, “Fast and robust approach to long-distance quantum communication
with atomic ensembles,” Phys. Rev. A 76, 012301 (2007).
27. B. Zhao, Z.-B. Chen, Y.-A. Chen, J. Schmiedmayer, and J.-W. Pan, “Robust creation of entanglement between
remote memory qubits,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 240502 (2007).
28. J. B. Brask, L. Jiang, A. V. Gorshkov, V. Vuletic, A. S. Sørensen, and M. D. Lukin “Fast entanglement distribution
with atomic ensembles and fluorescent detection,” Phys. Rev. A 81, 020303(R) (2010).
29. J. Amirloo, M. Razavi, and A. H. Majedi, “Quantum key distribution over probabilistic quantum repeaters,” Phys.
Rev. A 82, 032304 (2010).
30. A. J. Miller, S. W. Nam, J. M. Martinis, and A. V. Sergienko, “Demonstration of a low-noise near-infrared photon
counter with multiphoton discrimination,” Appl. Phys. Lett. 83, 791–793 (2003).
31. D. Rosenberg, A. E. Lita, A. J. Miller, S. W. Nam, and R. E. Schwall, “Performance of photon-number resolving
transition-edge sensors with integrated 1550 nm resonant cavities,” IEEE Trans. Appl. Superconductivity 15(2),
575–578 (2005).
32. D. Rosenberg, A. E. Lita, A. J. Miller, and S. W. Nam, “Noise-free high-efficiency photon-number-resolving
detectors,” Phys. Rev. A. 71, 061803(R) (2005).
33. G. N. Gol’tsman, O. Okunev, G. Chulkova, A. Lipatov, A. Semenov, K. Smirnov, B. Voronov, A. Dzardanov, C.
Williams, and R. Sobolewski, “Picosecond superconducting single-photon optical detector,” Appl. Phys. Lett. 79,
705–707 (2001).
34. K. M. Rosfjord, J. K. W. Yang, E. A. Dauler, A. J. Kerman, V. Anant, B. M. Voronov, G. N. Gol’tsman, and K. K.
Berggren, “Nanowire single-photon detector with an integrated optical cavity and anti-reflection coating,” Opt.
Express 14, 527–534 (2006).
35. A. J. Kerman, E. A. Dauler, W. E. Keicher, J. K. W. Yang, K. K. Berggren, G. Gol’tsman, and B. Voronov,
“Kinetic-inductance-limited reset time of superconducting nanowire photon counters,” Appl. Phys. Lett. 88,
111116 (2006).
36. A. Divochiy, F. Marsili, D. Bitauld, A. Gaggero, R. Leoni, F. Mattioli, A. Korneev, V. Seleznev, N. Kaurova,
O. Minaeva, G. Gol’tsman, K. G. Lagoudakis, M. Benkhaoul, F. Le´vy, and A. Fiore, “Superconducting nanowire
photon-number-resolving detector at telecommunication wavelengths,” Nature Photonics 2, 302–306 (2008).
37. H. Hu¨bel, M. R. Vanner, T. Lederer, B. Blauensteiner, T. Loru¨nser, A. Poppe, and A. Zeilinger, “High-fidelity
transmission of polarization encoded qubits from an entangled source over 100 km of fiber,” Opt. Express 15,
7853–7862 (2007).
38. R. Ursin, F. Tiefenbacher, T. Schmitt-Manderbach, H. Weier, T. Scheidl, M. Lindenthal, B. Blauensteiner, T. Jen-
newein, J. Perdigues, P. Trojek, B. ¨Omer, M. Fu¨rst, M. Meyenburg, J. Rarity, Z. Sodnik, C. Barbieri, H. Wein-
furter, and A. Zeilinger, “Entanglement-based quantum communication over 144 km,” Nature Physics 3, 481–486
(2007).
39. M. Halder, A. Beveratos, N. Gisin, V. Scarani, C. Simon, and H. Zbinden, “Entangling independent photons by
time measurement,” Nature Physics 3, 692–695 (2007)
40. E. Saglamyurek, N. Sinclair, J. Jin, J. A. Slater, D. Oblak, F. Bussie`res, M. George, R. Ricken, W. Sohler, and
W. Tittel, “Broadband waveguide quantum memory for entangled photons,” Nature 469, 512-515 (2011).
41. G. B. Xavier, G. Vilela de Faria, G. P. Tempora˜o, and J. P. von der Weid, “Full polarization control for fiber
optical quantum communication systems using polarization encoding,” Opt. Express 16, 1867–1873 (2008).
42. I. Lucio-Martinez, P. Chan, X. Mo, S. Hosier, and W. Tittel, “Proof-of-concept of real-world quantum key dis-
tribution with quantum frames,” New J. Phys. 11, 095001 (2009).
43. H. de Riedmatten, I. Marcikic, J. A. W. van Houwelingen, W. Tittel, H. Zbinden and N. Gisin, “Long-distance
entanglement swapping with photons from separated sources,” Phys. Rev. A. 71, 050302 (2005).
44. J. G. Rarity and P. R. Tapster, “Experimental violation of Bell’s inequality based on phase and momentum,” Phys.
Rev. Lett. 64, 2495–2498 (1990).
45. P. W. Shor and J. Preskill, “Simple Proof of Security of the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol,” Phys.
Rev. Lett. 85, 441–444 (2000).
46. J. Calsamiglia and N. Lu¨tkenhaus, “Maximum efficiency of a linear-optical Bell-state analyzer,” Appl. Phys. B
72, 67–71 (2001).
47. G. Brassard and L. Salvail, “Secret-Key Reconciliation by Public Discussion,” in Advances in Cryptology –
EUROCRYPT ’93 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 765) (Springer, Berlin, 1994), pp. 410–423.
48. M. Koashi and J. Preskill, “Secure Quantum Key Distribution with an Uncharacterized Source,” Phys. Rev.
Lett. 90, 057902 (2003).
49. N. J. Beaudry, T. Moroder, and N. Lu¨tkenhaus, “Squashing Models for Optical Measurements in Quantum Com-
munication,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 101, 093601 (2008).
50. T. Moroder, O. Gu¨hne, N. J. Beaudry, M. Piani, and N. Lu¨tkenhaus, “Entanglement verification with realistic
measurement devices via squashing operations,” Phys. Rev. A 81, 052342 (2010).
1. Introduction
Quantum cryptography technologies have matured to commercial applications [1]. Yet long-
distance quantum communication and particularly long-distance quantum key distribution
(QKD) are hampered by exponential channel loss of photons with respect to transmission dis-
tance. Quantum relays [2, 3, 4, 5, 6] and quantum repeaters [7] could solve these distance limits
by exploiting entanglement swapping (ES) [8] between photon pairs as a key building block.
However, ES based on present technology is performance-limited due to real-world imperfec-
tions.
ES is achieved with two sources of entangled photon pairs (EPPs) and a joint Bell-state
measurement (BSM) performed on two of their outputs, specifically one from each source.
Realistic EPP sources are probabilistic, and occasionally emit two or more independent EPPs.
Spontaneous parametric down-conversion (PDC) in nonlinear crystals is the most common way
to produce EPPs. Detectors used to perform BSM are inefficient and suffer from dark counts.
Aiming at realistic aspects of ES-based QKD, we have studied the effect of experimental im-
perfections on ES-generated entangled quantum states (in terms of their fidelity with a target
Bell state) via a non-perturbative mathematical model for practical ES accounting for detector
inefficiencies, detector dark counts and multipair events [9]. Our closed-form solution for re-
alistic ES-generated quantum states determines the “amount” of useful entanglement, which
depends on experimental parameters such as dark-count rates and efficiencies of off-the-shelf
detectors as well as brightness of PDC sources. This realism makes our model useful for plan-
ning long-distance QKD experiments employing ES, which is demonstrated in this paper.
The impact of real-world imperfections on the performance and communication range of
QKD has been the objective of numerous recent investigations [10]. In [11] Brassard et al.
showed that channel losses, a realistic detection process, and qubit-source imperfections dras-
tically impair the feasibility of QKD over long distances. In particular, it was shown in [11]
that unconditional security is difficult to achieve in long-distance QKD based on the BB84
protocol [12] realized by attenuated laser pulses instead of by idealized single-photon on-
demand sources; in the same work, a superior performance was obtained for QKD schemes
based on a single PDC source. The consequences of using probabilistic EPP sources (realized
by PDC) instead of by single-pair on-demand sources for quantum communication including
entanglement-based QKD have been investigated [13, 14, 15].
For long distances, the entanglement-based BBM92 QKD protocol [16] with a single PDC
source placed midway between the two communicating parties was shown to perform signif-
icantly better than BB84-based QKD realized by faint coherent-state pulses under the restric-
tion to individual eavesdropping attacks and trusted noisy detectors [3]. Even though faint-
pulse BB84 QKD with decoy states (decoy-BB84 QKD) [17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22] permits much
larger communication ranges than conventional faint-pulse BB84 QKD without decoy states,
PDC-based BBM92 QKD with the source in the middle tolerates higher channel loss and thus
enables longer communication distance than decoy-BB84 QKD [13], setting aside the fact
that the latter protocol can realize appreciably higher key-distribution rates than the former
for medium- and low-loss settings. Moreover, for ideal EPP sources, ES-based BBM92 QKD
schemes were proven to allow achieving even greater distances at the cost of smaller commu-
nication rates [3, 6].
Here we extend our entanglement-swapping model [9] to practical QKD based on distribut-
ing entangled photons over extended distances by ES and relying only on existing off-the-shelf
technology. The resources we consider are (i) lossy transmission links, such as telecom optical
fibers or free space, (ii) spontaneous PDC to produce EPPs and (iii) inefficient, noisy thresh-
old detectors. We show how to employ these resources so as to optimize QKD performance.
We determine the QKD figures of merit quantum bit error rate (QBER) and secret key rate
as functions of experimental parameters. Our theory permits constrained optimization of the
experimentally tunable detector efficiencies and dark count rates as well as brightness of PDC
thereby yielding optimal QKD performance for any distance d between sender Alice and re-
ceiver Bob.
Determining optimal source brightness is important for both faint-pulse BB84 QKD and
PDC-based BBM92 QKD. Low source brightness implies a low key-generation rate. How-
ever, as the source brightness increases, the multiphoton-signal probability for faint-pulse BB84
QKD or multipair probability for PDC-based BBM92 QKD rises. In faint-pulse BB84 QKD,
multiphoton signals are vulnerable to photon number splitting (PNS) attacks which jeopardize
QKD security. Decoy states [17, 18, 19, 20]) are generally used as a remedy to tackle this prob-
lem. Although PNS attacks do not help an eavesdropper in PDC-based BBM92 QKD [2, 6],
occasional multipairs cause erroneous heralding events, thus contributing to QBER (see Sec. 2).
The optimal mean photon number per signal for faint-pulse coherent-state QKD can be deter-
mined [20, 23] as well as the optimal source brightness for PDC-based BBM92 QKD with a sin-
gle PDC source placed midway between sender and receiver [13]. Although the effects of trans-
mission losses, detector inefficiencies and dark counts on the performance of quantum relays
has been examined [6], the probabilistic nature of realistic EPP sources including occasional
multipair events has not yet been incorporated. Our analysis yields optimal PDC-source bright-
ness for PDC-based BBM92 QKD exploiting ES as a crucial tool (PDC-ES-BBM92 QKD)
for any channel distance given an empirical constraint between efficiency and dark counts for
common off-the-shelf detectors.
Multi-excitation events, as significant sources of error, have been considered in other re-
cent investigations that elaborate on practical implementations of the DLCZ quantum repeater
scheme [24]. The effects of multipair events in PDC, in addition to transmission losses, de-
tector and quantum memory imperfections on quantum repeater performance, have been ac-
counted for perturbatively [25]. The atom-light entangled states produced by Stokes scattering
in the DLCZ scheme are similar to the light-light entangled states produced by non-degenerate
PDC, as both are two-mode squeezed states. In these works [26, 27, 28] the impact of multi-
excitation contributions in such atom-light entangled states has also been taken into account
perturbatively. A more thorough analysis of multi-excitation events in atomic-ensemble memo-
ries has been provided in [29]. Our theory is based on a substantially different approach, which
is non-perturbative and uses the principle of Bayesian inference to account for the presence of
experimental imperfections.
a b c dBS
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Fig. 1. Entanglement swapping based on two PDC sources and an interferometric BSM.
Four spatial modes are involved: a, b, c and d. The modes b and c are combined at a
balanced beamsplitter (BS). Outputs b′ and c′ are directed to polarizing beamsplitters (PBS)
and then detected at four photon detectors: one for the H and one for the V polarization of
each of the c′ and b′ modes. The detectors are inefficient and subject to dark counts. Their
readout is denoted by {q1,q2,q3,q4}. In a QKD experiment (see Fig. 2), the polarization-
entangled photons of the remaining modes a and d are distributed between Alice and Bob,
respectively, and the BBM92 protocol [16] can be applied to make the secret key.
Finally, we address the communication range and corresponding key generation rates
achieved by PDC-ES-BBM92 QKD compared to decoy-BB84 QKD. In particular, we analyze
the conjecture that there is no superiority of PDC-ES-BBM92 QKD over decoy-BB84 QKD
with respect to achievable range for detectors with negligible dark counts.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2 we identify the resources and describe how
we incorporate real-world imperfections into our mathematical model. In Sec. 3 we demon-
strate how to optimize the performance of PDC-ES-BBM92 QKD with respect to PDC sources
and detectors. Sec. 4 provides a comparison between PDC-ES-BBM92 QKD and decoy-BB84
QKD for negligibly small detector dark count rates. We conclude in Sec. 5 with a brief summary
and important remarks.
2. Identifying the resources
The photon transmission probability is 10−α l/10 for α the loss coefficient (in dB/km) and l
the distance the light travels. The loss differs depending on whether transmission is via fiber
optics or free space. In this analysis we leave the loss coefficient unspecified and normalize the
distance between sender and receiver through the product αd. For example, the loss coefficient
for light of wavelength 1550 nm propagating through a telecom optical fiber is approximately
α ≈ 0.25 dB km−1 [6], so αd = 10 (a “10 dB loss”) corresponds to d ≈ 40 km of fiber.
Basic experimental ES is illustrated in Fig. 1. Two PDC sources emit photon pairs into spatial
modes a and b (first PDC) and c and d (second PDC). For ES, a joint BSM is performed on
the b and c modes. As a consequence, provided that a certain measurement readout occurs, the
photons in outgoing modes a and d emerge entangled despite never having interacted with one
another [8]. The entanglement previously contained in the a and b and the c and d photon pairs,
respectively, is swapped to the a and d photon pair.
We assume type-I nondegenerate PDC as the generator of polarization-entangled quantum
states
|χ〉ab = exp[iχ(aˆ†H ˆb†H + aˆH ˆbH)]⊗ exp[iχ(aˆ†V ˆb†V + aˆV ˆbV)] |vac〉 (1)
in two spatial modes a and b, where |vac〉 is the multimode vacuum state. Our analysis is
straightforward to generalize to other types of entanglement. The parameter χ ∈ R is propor-
tional to the χ (2) nonlinearity of the crystal, the strength of the pump laser and the interaction
time between the pump laser and the medium, which is approximately the laser-pulse duration.
The value of χ2 (the square of χ , not to be confused with the crystal’s χ (2) nonlinearity) is
the probability for EPP generation within the time window of a laser pulse. Equivalently, χ2
can be interpreted as the EPP production rate (brightness) of the PDC source. We assume the
same brightness for both PDCs. The quantum state generated by the second PDC source is thus
|χ〉cd , and the common quantum state prepared by two identical PDC sources is then given by
|χ〉abcd = |χ〉ab ⊗ |χ〉cd . Exceedingly small χ values imply disadvantageously low EPP pro-
duction rates; however, as χ increases, the probability for harmful multipair events rises, which
lead to faulty detection clicks and thus incorrect estimates of entanglement after ES.
We model detector efficiency η (0 ≤ η ≤ 1) by preceding a fictitious unit-efficiency, dark-
count-exempt photon-counting detector with a virtual beamsplitter of transmittance η . We in-
clude dark counts by a fictitious thermal background source of light incident on the second
input port of the beamsplitter. Dark counts are incorporated by the dark count probability ℘dc
per time window of the pump laser pulse in the PDC process. In our model transmission losses
are included in detector efficiencies according to η = η010−α l/10, where η0 denotes the intrin-
sic detector efficiency.
Detector quality is important for long-distance QKD. On the one hand, detectors should be
as efficient as possible to achieve fast key rates and high efficiency for ES operation. On the
other hand, dark count noise should be low to make the QBER small. In experiments these
two aims compete: η0 and ℘dc counteract for typical off-the-shelf detectors. Avalanche photo-
diodes (APDs) are the most used photon detectors in long-distance quantum communication
experiments over telecom optical fibres, with InGaAs/InP diodes being the most common. The
trade-off between efficiency and dark counts for high quality InGaAs APD detectors at optical
telecom wavelength 1550 nm can be characterized by the empirical relation
℘dc = Aexp(Bη0) (2)
with typical values A = 6.1× 10−7 and B = 17 [6]. For simplicity, we assume the same effi-
ciency η0 and dark count probability ℘dc, respectively, for all detectors employed in the here
considered QKD scheme, subject to the empirical constraint (2).
In fact single-photon detectors other than APDs have been prototyped. Most notable are
superconducting transition-edge sensors (TES), which are photon-number-resolving with up
to 88% detection efficiency at 1550 nm and benefit from negligible dark count rates [30, 31,
32]. A further type with a demonstrated photon-number-resolving functionality is given by
superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPDs) [33, 34, 35, 36], which combine
a high infrared detection efficiency (up to 57% at 1550 nm [34]) with an ultra-low dark count
rate and a high counting frequency [36]. Such detectors (TES or SNSPDs) substantially increase
the range, security and bit rate for QKD. However, a severe drawback of both TES and SNSPDs
is the fact that they must be operated at cryogenic temperatures, which makes them impractical
for off-the-shelf QKD technology.
Transmission of polarization-encoded qubits naturally suffers from depolarization, i.e.,
environment-induced randomization of photon polarization. The amount of this depolarization
depends on the properties of the quantum channel, i.e., on the specific fiber used for photon
transmission or atmospheric conditions in the case of free-space QKD, as well as on the spec-
tral band-width of the individual photons. Nevertheless, modern fibers affect the polarization
far less than previously thought. High-fidelity transmission of polarization-encoded qubits from
EPP sources is possible and was successfully demonstrated over 100 km of fiber [37] and in
free space even up to 144 km [38]. Such high-fidelity transmission can be extended to even
greater distances by spectral filtering of the down-converted photons [39, 40]. Moreover, var-
ious implementations have demonstrated how to remedy birefringence-caused, time-varying
unitary polarization transformations during photon transmission. Promising proposals include,
e.g., real-time polarization control employing two nonorthogonal reference signals multiplexed
in either time or wavelength with the data signal [41] as well as stabilization of unwanted qubit
transformation in the quantum channel using quantum frames [42]. Hence, for distances up to
100 km, and probably beyond this range, the degree of observed quantum correlations is limited
mainly by detector dark counts and multi-pair emissions rather than by depolarization, which
we neglect in the present analysis.
Previously we derived a nonperturbative, closed-form solution for the quantum states
ρˆ{qν} (χ ,{ην},{℘dcν}) prepared by a realistic ES, given a recorded readout {qν} (e.g.
{q1,q2,q3,q4} in Fig. 1) of a BSM with faulty detectors characterized by efficiencies {ην}
and dark count probabilities {℘dcν} (ν is a label for different detectors involved in the BSM),
as a density-operator valued function of χ , {ην} and {℘dcν} [9]. Using this closed-form solu-
tion, we can simulate a four-fold coincidence experiment. A direct measure for entanglement
quantification after ES is the visibility V := (MAX−MIN)/(MAX + MIN), where “MAX” and
“MIN” denote the maximum and minimum values of the four-fold coincidence rate as a func-
tion of polarization angle. Provided that click events are observed in both the a and d modes,
and restricting ourselves to the corresponding post-selected quantum states ρˆ{qν}postsel , the visibil-
ity is directly connected to the fidelity F =
〈
ψT
∣
∣ ρˆ{qν}postsel
∣
∣ψT
〉
with respect to a target Bell state∣
∣ψT
〉
via the relation V = (4F − 1)/3 [43]. The relation between visibility and correlation co-
efficient SCHSH of the CHSH Bell inequality is SCHSH = 2
√
2V , cf. [44]. Our predictions [9] agree
with experimental results [43]: our theory predicts Vtheory = 77.7%, and the observed visibility in
experiment was Vexp = (80± 4)%.
3. Optimizing QKD performance
We numerically simulate the effect of real-world imperfections on the two common QKD fig-
ures of merit, quantum bit error rate (QBER) and secret key rate Rsec, for an entanglement-based
QKD experiment in which the long-distance quantum channel (with distance d) between sender
Alice and a receiver Bob is split into shorter segments with two PDC sources placed 1/4 and
3/4 of the way along the channel and a BSM performed halfway (Fig. 2). Due to ES, the pho-
tons distributed between Alice and Bob are entangled, so the BBM92 protocol can be applied
to produce the key.
Alice
BSM
PDC source PDC source
Bob 
Fig. 2. Illustration of ES-based QKD. The quantum channel between Alice and Bob is
split into shorter segments, with two PDC sources placed 1/4 and 3/4 of the way along
the channel and a joint BSM performed halfway. Given a successful BSM (with success
probability equal to 12 η20 ), the photons arriving at Alice and Bob are entangled despite
never having interacted with one another, and the BBM92 protocol can be used to create
the secret key.
The QBER, defined as the ratio of wrong bits to the total number of bits exchanged between
Alice and Bob, is directly related to the visibility V of four-fold coincidence measurements via
the relation QBER = (1−V )/2 [2]. Hence, it can be computed nonperturbatively using our
closed-form solution [9]. For compactness, the procedure for computation of V is not repeated
in the present paper.
For one-way communication, which we analyze here, according to Shor and Preskill’s secu-
rity proof the secret key yield is [45]
Rsec = Rsift [1−κH2(QBER)−H2(QBER)] . (3)
The first factor, Rsift, is the sifted key rate; it is the number of all coincidental detection events
(per second) for which Alice and Bob made by chance compatible choices of bases in which
they measured the received photons. Hence, the sifted key rate is only half that of the raw key
rate, which consists of the overall number of qubits exchanged between Alice and Bob. The
raw key rate is obtained as a product of the following probabilities per attempt of ES: (i) the
probability that both PDCs emit EPPs, which is the product of their photon-pair production
rates χ2, respectively, (ii) the probability that the generated photons arrive at the analyzers of
both Alice and Bob as well as at the BSM device, (iii) the probabilities that the photons that
arrive at Alice’s and Bob’s sites are also detected, and (iv) the probability that the BSM is
successful, which is equal to 12 η20 and thus bounded by its maximum value 1/2 [46]. Hence, for
the QKD scheme considered here, under our assumptions,
Rsift =
1
2
χ2χ2(10−αd/40)4η20 (
1
2
η20 ) =
1
4
χ4η40 × 10−αd/10. (4)
The second factor of Eq. (3) describes the effect of privacy amplification. The two subtracted
terms κH2(QBER) and H2(QBER), where
H2(x)≡−x log2(x)− (1− x) log2(1− x) for x ∈ [0,1] (5)
is the binary Shannon entropy function, represent the reduction of the key rate due to error
correction and eavesdropping on the quantum transmission, respectively, with κ = 1.22 char-
acterizing the efficiency of error correction algorithm compared to the Shannon limit [47].
We remark that the Shor-Preskill lower bound for the ratio between the number of secure key
bits and the number of sifted key bits, as given by Eq. (3), was derived under the assumption
of perfect sources and detectors; i.e., it was assumed that any source or detector imperfections
can be absorbed into eavesdropper Eve’s attack. The same bound was achieved by Koashi and
Preskill in their QKD security proof for an arbitrary (possibly faulty) source with the only re-
striction that the source must not reveal any information to Eve about the basis chosen by Alice
and Bob for their measurements [48]. This feature is naturally satisfied for our entanglement-
based PDC-ES-BBM92 QKD. The Koashi-Preskill security proof indicates that source defects
are efficiently detected by the QKD protocol — in our case the BBM92 protocol rather than
BB84. This means that Alice and Bob cannot be fooled into accepting a part of the secret key
that Eve got to know by exploiting source imperfections.
Both Shor-Preskill [45] and Koashi-Preskill [48] security proofs rely on the crucial assump-
tion that Alice’s and Bob’s measurements are performed on qubits. This assumption is certainly
not valid for real-world QKD. In our PDC-ES-BBM92 QKD scheme, polarization measure-
ments are implemented by means of polarization rotators (quarter- and half-wave plates), PBSs
and threshold detectors acting on multiphoton states in spatio-temporal optical modes. The cor-
responding detection events are theoretically described by POVMs over the infinite-dimensional
Fock space. Yet, by using squashing techniques [49, 50], which are directly applicable to our
setup, all detection events of our QKD scheme can indeed be reduced to a statistically equiv-
alent two-dimensional qubit-based description. The existence of a squashing model permits
employing the Shor-Preskill lower bound (3) for our QKD scheme. It also ensures validity of
our entanglement verification via four-fold coincidence measurements with (realistic) threshold
detectors (see [50]).
Our results are illustrated in Figs. 3–7. Fig. 3 displays the dependence of the QBER on the
parameter χ for various fixed values of the product αd, whereas Fig. 4 shows the QBER’S de-
pendence on αd for various fixed χ values. In both figures, η0 and℘dc are fixed and interrelated
by constraint (2). As expected, for a fixed distance, the QBER is large for exceedingly small
as well as for notably large χ values. This dependence can be understood as follows. In the
case of excessively low photon-pair PDC production rates (exceedingly small χ values), most
detection events arise due to detector dark counts, which contribute noise, thus implying an
increase of the QBER. As the photon-pair production rate increases, the constant detector noise
level becomes less relevant so that most detector clicks are due to correctly detecting single
photons stemming from PDC sources, thereby entailing a low QBER value. On the other hand,
excessively high photon-pair production rates (large χ values) are counterproductive as they
involve a higher probability of multipair events in the PDC process, thereby making the QBER
grow. As we observe in Fig. 3, our theory predicts the value of χ that minimizes the QBER for
given channel length and loss coefficient. Conversely, given fixed χ , we know how the QBER
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Fig. 3. QBER as a function of χ for various values of the normalized distance αd and fixed
η0 and℘dc. The function is plotted for αd = 0,5,10,25 and 50, corresponding, respectively,
to the curves of lowest- to highest-QBER values in all diagrams, and η0 = 0.1 & ℘dc ≈
3×10−6 in figures (a) and (b), or η0 = 0.3 & ℘dc ≈ 10−4 in figures (c) and (d). The values
of η0 and ℘dc are related to one another by constraint (2). Figures (a) and (c) display a
higher resolution for very small χ values in both cases. To have Rsec > 0 the QBER must
assume values less than approx. 0.094 if κ = 1.22 (0.11 if κ = 1.0).
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Fig. 4. QBER vs αd for various χ values and fixed η0 and ℘dc. The function is plotted
for χ = 10−4, 10−3, 10−2, 0.1, and 0.2, corresponding to the dotted, dot-dashed, dashed,
gray solid and dark solid curves, respectively, in both diagrams, and (a) η0 = 0.1 & ℘dc ≈
3×10−6 or (b) η0 = 0.3 & ℘dc ≈ 10−4. The values of η0 and ℘dc are related to one another
by constraint (2).
scales with distance d. We also find that, as far as QBER is concerned, lower detector efficiency
is preferable, given the constraint (2). Note that, to achieve non-vanishing secret key rates the
QBER must not exceed the value 0.094 if κ = 1.22. (0.11 if κ = 1.0).
However, optimal brightness for QKD is not given by the value of χ that minimizes the
QBER because two effects contribute to Rsec’s dependence on χ . The first contribution is via
the sifted key rate, which increases proportionally with χ4. The second contribution is via the
QBER in a nontrivial way (see the second factor in Eq. (3)). For the highest possible Rsec, an
optimal trade-off between the production rate of final EPPs and the amount of entanglement
after the ES operation has to be achieved.
For QKD the relevant quantity to be optimized is the secret key rate Rsec, whose dependence
on χ and η0 is displayed in Figs. 5 and 6 for various values of αd. Our model reveals the
optimal χ and η0 that maximize the secret key rate for given channel length. We have performed
a constrained optimization, both with respect to χ and η0, assuming constraint (2) between the
detector efficiencies and dark counts for APD detectors. The result is presented in Fig. 7.
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Fig. 5. logRsec as a function of χ for various values of the product αd, and fixed η0 and℘dc.
Plots are displayed for αd = 0,5,10,25, and 50, corresponding, respectively, to the dark
solid, gray solid, dashed, dot-dashed and dotted curves in both diagrams, and (a) η0 = 0.1
& ℘dc ≈ 3× 10−6 or (b) η0 = 0.3 & ℘dc ≈ 10−4. Dark count probabilities are related to
the values of η0 by constraint (2). The value of Rsec is the number of secure bits created
per single pump-laser pulse.
Fig. 6. Secret key rate Rsec as a function of χ and η0 for various exemplary values of
the product αd. From left to right: (a) αd = 1, (b) αd = 5, (c) αd = 10, (d) αd = 25,
(e) αd = 40 and (f) αd = 50. Dark count probabilities are related to the values of η0 by
constraint (2), respectively. Here Rsec is given in terms of the number of secure bits created
per single pump-laser pulse (precisely: for each attempt of ES, which requires two laser
pulses, specifically with one per crystal).
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Fig. 7. (a) Optimal χ and (b) optimal η0 values for QKD as a function of the product αd.
The dark count parameter ℘dc is related to η0opt by constraint (2).
4. Comparison: PDC-ES-BBM92 QKD vs Decoy-BB84 QKD
Decoy-BB84 QKD, invented to combat QKD vulnerability due to PNS attacks, was shown
to enable achieving much greater distances than conventional faint-pulse BB84 QKD without
decoy states [19, 22]. Furthermore, decoy-BB84 QKD realizes substantially higher key dis-
tribution rates than PDC-based BBM92 QKD for medium- and low-loss settings (i.e. short
distances), while the latter tolerates higher channel losses, hence permitting longer communi-
cation distance than the former [13]. Additional range extensions are possible by means of ES
at cost of low communication rates; this fact has been demonstrated for ES based on ideal EPP
sources in [3, 6]. Here we compare PDC-ES-BBM92 QKD and decoy-BB84 QKD with respect
to achievable distance. In particular, we analyze the issue whether the advantage of ES-based
BBM92 QKD with regard to range limits is due to a better scaling with respect to dark counts
rather than due to a higher tolerance of losses and thus would vanish for promising future de-
tectors with negligible dark count rates. In the discussion below, the detector efficiency and
dark counts are assumed not to be constrained.
For decoy-BB84 QKD, the key generation rate is given by the formula [20]
Rdecoysec ≥
1
2
{−Qµ f (Eµ)H2
(
Eµ
)
+Q1 [1−H2 (e1)]
}
, (6)
where µ denotes the intensity (photon number expectation value) of signal states sent by Alice
to Bob, Qµ is the gain of signal states, Eµ is the overall QBER of signal states, Q1 is the gain of
single-photon states in signal states, e1 is the error rate of single-photon states in signal states,
and f (x) is the error correction efficiency function. While Qµ and Eµ can be measured directly
from the experiment, Q1 and e1 have to be estimated.
Here we employ the practical vacuum & weak-decoy state method, i.e., a two-decoy-state
protocol with expected photon numbers ν1 = 0 and ν2 = ν ≪ 1, which has been shown to
asymptotically approach the theoretical limit of the most general type of decoy state protocol
(with an infinite number of decoy states) [20]. See also [21] for an efficient and feasible three-
decoy-state protocol (using vacuum and two decoy states). The weak decoy state method allows
to lower-bound Q1 and upper-bound e1. Here we use the corresponding bounds derived in [20]
as well as definitions of Eµ and Qµ provided therein. We choose the same error correction
efficiency as for PDC-ES-BBM92 QKD in Eq. (3), f (Eµ) = κ = 1.22 [47]. Furthermore, for
a fair comparison, we assume that only dark counts and other background events contribute to
Eµ , while we neglect erroneous detection events due to alignment and stability imperfections
of the optical system, which have not been accounted for in our model for PDC-ES-BBM92
QKD either. The optimal choice of ν , which depends on the transmission distance, has also
been analyzed in [20]; the optimal ν is fairly small (∼ 0.1) for all distances. Here we choose
the fixed value ν = 0.1, which is reasonable as shown in [20].
We have computed the secret-key rate as a function of αd for both PDC-ES-BBM92 QKD
(using Eq. (3)) and decoy-BB84 QKD (using Eq. (6) with lower and upper bounds for Q1 and
e1 from Ref. [20]) for detectors with the fixed efficiency η0 = 0.2 and diminishing dark count
noise, see Fig. 8. Optimal source brightness (i.e., optimal values of χ and µ , respectively) has
been chosen for each value of αd, respectively, so as to achieve highest QKD performance at
each distance. As demonstrated in Fig. 8, decoy-BB84 QKD permits significantly higher key
distribution rates for short distances up to the crossover point at which Rdecoysec rapidly drops to zero
causing a steep slope of logRdecoysec , while PDC-ES-BBM92 QKD enables much longer range. As
℘dc decreases, the range of both decoy-BB84 QKD and PDC-ES-BBM92 QKD increases and
the crossover point moves to larger distances. As a consequence, the advantage of PDC-ES-
BBM92 over decoy-BB84 QKD with respect to range diminishes because the communication
rate of the former beyond the crossover point becomes gradually prohibitively low.
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Fig. 8. Comparison between decoy-BB84 and PDC-ES-BBM92 QKD performance for de-
creasing dark count noise. All three diagrams display the logarithm of Rsec vs αd for decoy-
BB84 QKD (gray curve) and for PDC-ES-BBM92 QKD (dark curve), with optimal choice
of source brightness for every value of αd, respectively, and the fixed detector efficiency
η0 = 0.2. The detector dark count probabilities are (a) ℘dc = 1.8×10−5 (complying with
constraint (2)), (b) ℘dc = 10−6 and (c) ℘dc = 10−10 (ignoring constraint (2) in (b) and (c)).
There is no crossover of the curves (corresponding to logRdecoysec and logRESsec vs αd) for℘dc = 0.
Whereas, in this limit, logRdecoysec keeps decreasing linearly for all αd, logRESsec eventually drops
exponentially. Intuitively this is obvious. Under our assumptions, in decoy-BB84 QKD the
overall QBER, Eµ , and the error rate of single-photon states, e1, are caused only by dark count
noise; for℘dc = 0 both Eµ = 0 and e1 = 0, implying, according to Eq. (6), Rdecoysec ≥Q1/2, which
decreases exponentially without range limit. In PDC-ES-BBM92 QKD, in addition to dark
counts, multipair events of PDC sources contribute to the overall quantum bit error rate, so
℘dc = 0 does not imply a vanishing QBER. It is of no practical interest to determine the point
at which the range of decoy-BB84 QKD outdistances the range achieved in PDC-ES-BBM92
QKD, because the corresponding key rates become extremely small, thus useless.
As illustrated in Fig. 9(a), the achievable range in PDC-ES-BBM92 QKD is quite sensitive
to the choice of PDC source brightness, whereas in decoy-BB84 QKD the key rate and distance
are fairly stable against a variation of µ . Hence, particularly for PDC-ES-BBM92 QKD, it is
necessary to optimize the source brightness for each given distance. Furthermore, for negligi-
ble dark counts, increasing the detector efficiency yields a higher key rate as well as a longer
distribution range. The impact of detector efficiency increase on QKD performance is more
significant for PDC-ES-BBM92 QKD than for decoy-BB84 QKD, as shown in Fig. 9(b). This
is easily understandable. In decoy-BB84 QKD photon detections take place only at Bob’s site,
whereas, in ES-based BBM92 QKD, additional detectors are employed at Alice’s site as well
as to perform a BSM.
5. Conclusions
ES is a fundamental building block in entanglement-based quantum communication schemes
over long distances. We propose a nonperturbative theory for practical QKD based on ES. Af-
ter identifying and characterizing the resources for QKD, we perform constrained optimization
of QKD performance with respect to PDC sources and detectors for any distance d between
sender and receiver and for arbitrary loss coefficients. For QKD schemes via a single ES oper-
ation, the PDC brightness and the detector efficiencies should be tuned so that 0.12 < χ < 0.19
and 0.25 < η0 < 0.48 depending on αd and the empirical constraint (2) between the detector
efficiency and dark counts. Our theory assumes only existing technology. Even though we have
elaborated on PDC sources and APD detectors, our model can straightforwardly be applied to
other types of realistic EPP sources and detectors. With respect to eavesdropping, we assume
that the eavesdropper (Eve) exploits all experimental imperfections. Our predictions provide
useful upper bounds on the ES-based long-distance QKD performance. Although the advantage
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Fig. 9. (a) Effect of source brightness variation on key generation rate and distribution range
for fixed η0 = 0.2 and negligible dark counts, ℘dc = 10−12. In decoy-BB84 QKD, the key
rate and range are fairly stable against a change of µ (as already pointed out in [20]): the
curves corresponding to µ = 0.8 (dotted) and µ = 0.4 (gray solid) coincide. In PDC-ES-
BBM92 QKD, the key rate and achievable range depend drastically on source brightness,
as demonstrated by the curves corresponding to χ = 0.174 (dark solid), χ = 0.172 (dot-
dashed) and χ = 0.12 (dashed), respectively. (b) Effect of detector efficiency variation on
key generation rate and distribution range for fixed℘dc = 10−12 and fixed source brightness,
µ = 0.7 and χ = 0.120, respectively. Predictions for two different η0 values are shown.
For η0 = 0.9 yielding the dotted curve for decoy-BB84 and the dashed curve for PDC-
ES-BBM92 QKD, higher key rates and longer distances are achieved than for η0 = 0.1
yielding the gray solid curve for decoy-BB84 and dark solid curve for PDC-ES-BBM92
QKD. The effect is substantially greater for PDC-ES-BBM92 than for decoy-BB84 QKD.
of ES-based QKD over faint-pulse decoy-BB84 QKD, with respect to achievable distances, di-
minishes for detectors with negligibly small dark count rates, ES-based QKD is also important
as an enabler for quantum repeater-based QKD.
Our analysis could be further improved by accounting for temporal-mode overlap imper-
fections on a beam-splitter as well as spectral-mode mismatch. Moreover, we conjecture that
the optimal PDC brightness could be shifted to higher values by employing (realistic) photon-
counting detectors instead of threshold detectors. Our closed-form solution for the actual entan-
gled quantum states prepared by practical ES [9] allows for inefficient, noisy photon-number
discriminating detectors for the BSM. The intuition affirms this conjecture and is easily under-
stood as follows.
Let us consider the events where a coincidence detection by two threshold detectors for
modes b and c (in Fig. 1) is interpreted as a projection onto a Bell state. For threshold detectors,
a fraction of these cases originates from two (or more) photons impinging on one detector and
(at least) one photon impinging on the other detector, whenever at least one PDC source has
a multipair excitation. These harmful erroneous heralding events, which are not identifiable
by threshold detectors, may result in a failure of the ES operation and thus increase of the
QBER. On the other hand, unit-efficiency photon-number discriminating detectors would allow
to identify and discard these undesired events, which yields a lower QBER for equal-source
brightness or, conversely, allows increasing brightness while keeping the QBER constant. Even
imperfect photon-number discriminating detectors could reveal and thus enable to eliminate
the erroneous heralding events to some extent. Hence, optimum brightness for maximal QKD
performance could be chosen higher than in the case of threshold detectors, and one would
achieve higher secret-key production rates due to increasing values of the raw-key rate. This
conjecture is worth examining in view of promising technological advancements with photon-
number-resolving detectors [31, 32, 36].
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